Policy Research Working Paper 5605
The nature of the microeconomic frictions that transform sudden stops in output collapses is not only of academic interest, but also crucial for the correct design of policy responses to prevent and address these episodes and the lack of evidence on this regard is an important shortcoming. This paper uses industrylevel data in a sample of 45 developed and emerging countries and a differences-in-differences methodology to provide evidence of the role of financial frictions for the consequences of sudden stops. The results show that, This paper is a product of the Macroeconomics and Growth Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at craddatz@worldbank.org.
consistently with financial frictions being important, industries that are more dependent on external finance decline significantly more during a sudden stop, especially in less financially developed countries. The results are robust to controlling for other possible mechanisms, including labor market frictions. The paper also provides results on the role of comparative advantage during sudden stops and on the usefulness of various policy responses to attenuate the consequences of these shocks.
Introduction
In the last three decades, episodes of sharp contractions in international capital flows to emerging markets, known as sudden stops, have become a common phenomenon.
According to Edwards (2007) , and Rothenberg and Warnock (2006) , a typical emerging market country is affected by one of these episodes roughly once every decade. The increase in capital flows to "frontier" markets during the last decade and the revived interest in emerging markets following the recent global financial crisis suggest that sudden stops may now likely to affect a broader set of countries and may do it in a deeper manner.
In addition to their prevalence, the academic and policy interest in these episodes arises from the fact that they are typically associated with collapses in real activity. Edwards (2007) finds that the current account reversals associated with sudden stops lead to an average drop in GDP growth of about four percent, and Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006) document a collapse in GDP associated with systemic sudden stops of about 10 percent. These collapses in real activity are also typically accompanied by large depreciations and unemployment.
The simultaneous occurrence of sudden stops and output contractions is a stylized fact, but from a theoretical point of view, a sudden lack of access to international capital markets does not necessarily have to lead to a decline in GDP, as noticed by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2005) . They study a simple model of a small open economy that suffers a sudden tightening in its international collateral constraint, and show that, in absence of other shocks or frictions, this economy would increase GDP in response to the 2 sudden stop. 1 The intuition is straightforward: a (borrowing) economy that loses access to international capital markets needs to export goods to repay its initial debt. To reduce the negative impact of this shift on consumption, the representative consumer will work more and increase production. Therefore, this simple model shows that the correlation between sudden stops and output collapses results from other frictions that interact with the lack of access to international capital markets and counterweight the forces leading to an increase in output. between the external and internal cost of funds and distort some of the investment 1 Chari, Kehoe, and MacGrattan (2005) show that the impact of a sudden stop is equivalent to the impact of an increase in government consumption in a prototype closed economy, which absent other frictions leads to an increase in output (Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum, 1992) .
2 A slightly different view of sudden stops do not take the reversals as an external shock, but tries to derive them endogenously from the interaction of standard productivity or demand shocks and a series of market imperfections. Most of this literature focuses on financial market imperfections (Calvo, 1998; Mendoza, 2002; 2008; Mendoza and Smith, 2002; 2006) . In this literature, the sudden tightening of the international borrowing constraint does not trigger a recession, but is the recession (negative productivity shock) that triggers the tightening of the constraint and enhances the initial effect of the shock under appropriate conditions. According to this view, a recession would be more likely to result in a sudden stop in less financially developed countries, but it would still be the case that industries subject to stronger financial frictions and with smaller incentives to export would be the most affected.
margins. Other types of financial constraints are also present in the models of Calvo (1998), Mendoza (2002 Mendoza ( , 2008 , Mendoza and Smith (2002 and 2004) , among others. In most of this literature, the sudden tightening of the international borrowing constraint does not trigger a recession, but is the recession (e.g. negative productivity shock) that triggers the tightening of the constraint and enhances the initial effect of the shock under appropriate conditions. According to this view, a sudden stop, understood as a reversal in capital flows, is more likely to result in a recession in countries where financial frictions are more prevalent, and in a larger output decline in industries that are both more sensitive to financial frictions and less benefited by relative price changes favoring tradable sectors.
In parallel to the literature focusing on financial frictions, a smaller literature considers the role of labor market frictions that preclude the prompt reallocation of labor between tradable and non-tradable sectors required by the sudden stop of capital flows (Kehoe and Ruhl, 2007) . This type of mechanism would result in a relation between the degree of financial frictions in a country and its response to a sudden-stop. In addition, Martin and Rey (2006) consider the role of international segmentation of financial and good markets, incomplete asset markets, and expectation shocks to produce capital flights and output collapses in developing countries. This model would suggest some relation between the segmentation of goods markets and the impact of the expectations shock, which may translate in less tradable sectors being relatively more affected.
Despite the crucial role that micro-level frictions play in the determination of the real consequences of sudden stops from a theoretical perspective, there is little empirical evidence on their qualitative and quantitative importance. Most of the empirical literature on sudden stops has worked at the country level of aggregation, and has focused on quantifying the consequences of sudden stops on macro aggregates (Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia, 2008; Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi, 2006; Calvo, Izquierdo, and LooKung, 2006; Guidotti et al., 2004; Ortiz et al., 2007) . This literature studies the role of various types of macroeconomic imbalances in the incidence of sudden stops, and focuses on determining the role of ex-ante and ex-post policies in dampening their real consequences. The nature of the microeconomic frictions that transform sudden stops in output collapses is not only of academic interest, but also crucial for the correct design of policy responses to prevent and address these episodes and the lack of evidence on this regard is an important shortcoming. In reaction to this situation, Chari et al. (2005) This paper provides evidence of the importance of financial frictions for the propagation of sudden stops to the real economy using detailed industry level data for a large set of developed and emerging countries. The paper exploits the heterogeneous response of different industries to the occurrence of a sudden stop, and the relationship between these responses and industry characteristics to identify the mechanisms at work in the propagation of the sudden stops to the real economy. This approach has several advantages over existing studies based on aggregate (country-level) behavior. Most importantly, the reverse causality between macroeconomic performance and the occurrence of sudden stop is much less of a concern when looking at the relation between detailed industry-level activity and aggregate shocks, such as sudden stops. Furthermore, the heterogeneous responses of industries to sudden stops allow us to use a difference-indifference approach to identify the empirical importance of various possible mechanisms of transmission of sudden stops to the real economy. In particular, the paper tests whether, according to most existing theories, sudden stops result in a larger output decline in industries that are more sensitive to financial frictions and less likely to expand exports, and whether this is especially true in less financially developed countries. These hypotheses are tested using detailed output data for 28 industries comprising the complete manufacturing sector in a sample of 45 emerging and developed countries that experienced sudden-stops in the last 30 years.
The results show that, indeed, output in sectors with higher external financing needs contract relatively more during sudden-stops episodes. The average decline in output growth among manufacturing industries is about 5 percent, but an industry with high external dependence (one standard deviation above the average) contracts 3 percent more than an industry with low external dependence (one standard deviation below the average). This larger decline among industries with high external dependence is significantly more pronounced among countries where firms are likely to experience higher financial frictions, such as emerging markets or countries with less developed financial markets, and among industries with little comparative advantages that are less likely to experience pressure to expand production.
Both the average and differential effect of sudden stops are much larger when considering only the episodes that coincide with an aggregate output contraction (recession), especially among financially underdeveloped countries. This shows that the simultaneous occurrence of a sudden stop and recessions are episodes when financing constraints are particularly tight. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the interaction of sudden stops and financing constraints at the micro level is behind the correlation between sudden stops and aggregate output declines.
The different effect of sudden stops across countries with low and high financial development is not purely due to differences in the size of the aggregate contractions associated with the sudden stop. Controlling for this size, all industries, and especially those with high external dependence experience a larger output contraction among less 6 financially developed countries. However, when looking only at sudden stop recessions the average manufacturing growth decline among manufacturing industries is similar in financially developed and underdeveloped countries, and the larger differential effect on externally dependent industries operating in less financially developed countries previously documented becomes smaller statistically insignificant. This tells us that the interaction between sudden stops and financing constraints results in larger aggregate contractions among less financially developed countries than in more developed ones.
These results are robust to a battery of tests and do not crucially depend on the specific measure of sudden stops used or other details of the specification.
Looking at the differential impact of sudden stops on industries across other dimensions shows that durable industries also contract significantly more during these episodes, especially so in less financially developed countries. This is a very robust pattern of the data, and suggests that at least part of the cyclical behavior previously documented for durable industries come from financial frictions affecting the supply or demand for these goods. The results also show that industries with smaller comparative advantages decline relatively more during a sudden stop across all groups of countries.
We show that some policy actions may help reducing the impact of sudden stops on aggregate fluctuations. For instance, we show that a high level of international reserves reduces the average manufacturing output decline during a sudden stop, mainly by reducing the correlation between sudden stops and aggregate output contractions. In other words, in countries with high levels of reserves, a sudden stop is less likely to result in a recession, so the average and differential declines in manufacturing activity are smaller. Among sudden stops that are associated with recessions, a high level of initial reserves has no smoothing role. Nonetheless, we also show that following a loose monetary policy may also help dampening the impact of sudden stops both by reducing their correlation with recessions, but also by dampening their impact after a recession has started. These effects are more pronounced among emerging and less financially developed markets, showing that they do not come only from the comparison of industrial countries that can follow countercyclical policies and the rest. This paper contributes to the vast literature on the propagation and nature of sudden stops. As discussed above, the theoretical literature has shown that a capital flow reversal does not necessarily lead to output contraction, and that the propagation to the real side may require of additional frictions in financial or labor markets. it uses a larger sample of 47 countries worldwide and a granular set of 28 3-digit industries. Third, it controls for several industry characteristics that relate to the heterogeneous response of industries to sudden stops, such as the durability of the goods it produces, and its degree of comparative advantages. Finally, this paper also studies the role of standard policy responses such as reserve accumulation and countercyclical monetary policy in taming the real consequences of sudden stops.
3 Calvo (1998), Neumeyer and Perri (2005) , Mendoza (2008) , Christiano et al. (2004 ), Mendoza (2002 , 2008 , Mendoza and Smith (2002 and 2006) , among others.
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The paper also contributes to the recent literature on sudden stop recoveries. There has recently been an interest in the quick recoveries experienced by many emerging markets suffering from systemic banking and currency crises. This phenomenon has already been labeled as "V-shaped recoveries" and "Phoenix-miracles" by different authors (Eichengreen and Rose, 2003; Calvo et al., 2006) . The underlying observation being that in many countries output recovers surprisingly quickly after collapses of the exchange rate regime, banking sector, and massive capital flows reversals. Moreover, in many cases, this recovery seems to be "creditless" (Calvo et al., 2006) , that is, output (and to a lesser extent investment) expands without a commensurate expansion of credit. This evidence seems in contradiction with the liquidity crunch view of sudden stops, but could be explained by compositional changes in the structure of recovery. Industries that need relatively little outside liquidity to operate could benefit from the resources freed by liquidity squeezed sectors and lead the recovery. We show that industries with little need of external financing are indeed relatively benefited during these episodes, especially those that have revealed comparative advantages, indicating that these industries may be behind the speedy recovery observed after sudden stops.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the methodological approach used to test the hypothesis that sudden stops affect relatively more those industries that are more dependent in external finance, and especially so in countries with low financial development. Section 3 describes the data sources. Section 4 presents the main results of the paper. Section 5 conducts a series of robustness tests on the main results. Section 6 studies the role of policy responses. Section 7 concludes.
Methodology
If financial frictions are behind the negative impact of sudden stops on the real economy, industries that require larger amounts of external financing, that is those with higher external dependence, should be relatively more affected by these episodes, especially so in financially underdeveloped countries. 4 As noticed by Chari, Kehoe, and MacGrattan (2005) , a sudden stop also puts pressure to expand production through a simple wealth effect. For the sudden stop to result in a decline in output, it is necessary that financial frictions be strong enough to overcome these incentives to expand output to ship abroad. This is most likely to occur in sectors that require more external financing, especially in countries where this financing may be scarce.
This contraction is also more likely to occur for goods that are less tradable. In fact, there is widespread evidence that sudden stops result in a relative expansion of tradable sectors (Tornell and Martinez, 2003; Kehoe and Ruhl, 2009 ; among others). Thus, one would also expect that the industries that should decline the most during a sudden stop are those that are relatively less tradable and more exposed to financial frictions, regardless of whether it is sudden stops interacting with financial frictions that cause recessions or vice-versa.
To test these hypotheses, we estimate the parameters of the following empirical specification:
where ,, Nonetheless, in some of the robustness tests we will include country-year fixed effects to capture non-parametrically this source of variation.
Beyond the average effect of sudden stops across countries, if financial frictions are really at the core of the propagation mechanism, the coefficient should be larger in absolute value among financially underdeveloped countries, where financial frictions are more likely to bind. We test this hypothesis by separately estimating the model in equation
(1) among countries with relatively high and low levels of financial development (defined below) and financial market access. Furthermore, as explained above, the mechanism should be weaker in industries with stronger incentives to expand production to increase net exports. Thus, we also separately estimate the model using data from industries that are relatively more (less) competitive within a country, as captured by their revealed comparative advantages, and test whether the difference in between financially developed and underdeveloped countries is larger for industries with weaker comparative advantages. Finally, we also want to test whether certain policies, such as the accumulation of international reserves, help reduce the negative consequences of sudden stops. To this end we will add the interaction of the different variables in equation (1) with measures of policy responses and test whether indeed these interactions help explain differences in the average impact of sudden stops or differences in their impact across industries.
Data
For our main indicator of sudden stops, we follow Guidotti, Sturzenegger, and Villar (2004) SS with a recession indicator (defined below). In these cases, the sudden stop is associated with the whole recession episode. For instance, if a sudden stop occurs at any time during a 5-year recession or the year before a recession starts, we classify the whole 5 recession years as a sudden stop recession.
To define a recession we follow Braun and Larrain (2006) , and measure their occurrence using a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if a country is in recession a given year and zero otherwise. However, our main measure of recession differs from Braun and Larrain's (2006) in several respects. First, while Braun and Larrain use a relative threshold to identify recessions as cases when the deviations of GDP from its HP filtered trend are larger than one standard deviations, we use an absolute threshold and identify a recession with an output contraction, much in the spirit of Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004) . Starting from this criterion, we roughly identify a cyclical peak as the year in which real output growth turns negative, and a trough as the year in which it turns positive. All years between the peak and the trough are considered as part of the recession episode. Of course, most real-world cases do not fit nicely this U-shaped pattern of recession and recoveries, so we also established criteria to deal with cases of "double-dipping" and short-lived drops. The appendix describes the details of the procedure. In addition to this baseline definition of a recession, we also considered the Braun and Larrain (2006) country-specific definition. We construct all these measures using data on real local currency GDP from the World Bank (2007), World Development Indicators.
Following Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004) and Calvo, Izquierdo, and Loo-Kung (2006) we keep in our sample only countries that are integrated to global financial markets (emerging and developed economies) since the literature on sudden stops focuses on reversals in private capital flows that are likely different to the fluctuations in aid flows and remittances that constitute an important part of capital flows to poorer countries.
The sample of 47 developed and developing countries considered in this study, and the detailed list of episodes of capital account reversals, recessions, and sudden-stops experienced by each of them are reported in Table 1 reported, for instance, for value added. This is an important advantage when working with annual data, since it has been documented that price responses to sudden stops may be significantly different across sectors. Table 2 reports some summary statistics for the number of industries and growth rates of industries in the various countries included in the sample. In most countries, there is almost full coverage across the 28 industries and there is positive average industrial growth.
We measure the degree of external dependence of an industry using balance sheet data of listed manufacturing industries in the US, following Rajan and Zingales (1998) approach of considering these needs to be at least partially technologically determined, and measuring them in the United States, a country with well developed financial markets. for the firm's borrowing capacity during normal times (obtained from Braun, 2003) . 
Results
The average impact of sudden stops in the production of manufacturing industries and their differential effect across industries with different external financing needs are documented in Table 4 . The results indicate that, on average, sudden stops have a large negative and statistically significant impact on average manufacturing growth and that this impact is larger in industries with high external dependence (Column (1)). The differential effect across sectors is large. For the average industry, a typical sudden stop reduces industrial production in about 5 percent, but for an industry with a level of external financing needs of one (equal to one standard deviation above the mean), the decline is 3 percentage points larger than for an industry with a level of minus one (one standard deviation below the mean). This difference is almost as large as the average effect. This is consistent with sudden stops being associated to a tightening of financing constraints in the average country, and indicates that financial frictions may be behind the transmission of sudden stops to the real economy, as conjectured by many theoretical papers.
Consistent with sudden stops operating through financing constraints, both the average and differential effect of sudden stops are significantly larger in countries with less developed financial system. Among market-access countries (mainly emerging markets), the average decline in manufacturing output after a sudden stop is almost 7 percent, and the difference in decline among industries one standard deviation above and below the median of external dependence is 4 percent. Among industrial countries, the figures are 2 and 1.8 percent, respectively. Similarly, in countries with low financial development (those with average total capitalization to GDP below the sample median), the average decline is 7.6 percent and the differential decline is 5 percent. Among countries with high financial development, the average decline is 2.6 percent, and the differential decline is Not surprisingly, the average and differential effect of sudden stops are much larger when they coincide with a recession (Panel B). In these cases, there is a 10 percent average manufacturing output decline, and a differential decline of 5.6 percent. Among market access or financially underdeveloped countries, the average decline reaches 13 percent, and the differential decline 8 percent. As before, the figures are significantly smaller among industrial countries or financially developed ones.
Overall, the main results cannot reject the hypothesis that sudden stops result in output contractions by tightening financial constraints. The evidence unambiguously shows that these episodes result in a larger output decline among industries with higher external financial needs, especially so in financially underdeveloped countries. The results also
show that most of this differential effect occurs when sudden stops coincide with an aggregate output contraction (recession).
Using a simple indicator for the occurrence of a sudden stop allows us to compare average growth rates during these episodes with other times and across groups of countries. However, it has the disadvantage of not controlling for the size of the aggregate contraction resulting from the sudden stop. Thus, the larger average and differential declines observed among less financially developed countries might result from sudden stops being associated with larger aggregate declines among these countries, without larger declines in externally dependent industries per point of output contraction. The results in Table 5 show that this is not the case. As discussed above, Chari, Kehoe, and MacGrattan (2005) showed that in a simple model with an external financing constraint but without frictions, a sudden stop would result in an expansion in output because of its wealth effect. Countries would like to produce more to repay their debt without drastically reducing consumption. In their simple model, the only good available is tradable, but of course, debt repayment requires the production of tradable goods (a trade surplus). In a less stylized version, the current account reversals associated with these sudden stops would probably require the reallocation of factors towards exportable goods. This means that any pressure for production expansion would fall disproportionally on those goods where the country suffering the sudden stop has comparative advantages. Thus, one would expect the tightening of financing constraints to be less important to sectors that are favored by the movements in relative prices. To check for evidence of this mechanism, we constructed an average index of revealed comparative advantages (a la Balassa, 1965) for each industry in each country, and separated those industries within a country with an index above and below the country median as those with high and low comparative advantages. We then estimated the baseline specification separately in each of these groups. The results, reported in Table 6 , strongly support the view that financing constraints are less important for these sectors and that there are relative pressures to expand production in them. Across all countries, the average output decline in a sudden stop in industries with low comparative advantages is 6 percent (Column (1)), while in industries with high comparative advantages is about half as large at 4 percent (Column (2)). This is consistent with the reallocation toward tradable industries predicted by the wealth mechanism in, Kehoe, and MacGrattan (2005), and also consistent with the segmented market mechanism in Martin and Rey (2007) . Similarly, the differential output decline of an industry with low comparative advantages and high external dependence, relative to one with low external dependence is 4 percent (Column (1)). Similarly, comparing columns (3) and (4) with (5) and (6) shows that the larger differential of sudden stops in industries with high external dependence in financially underdeveloped countries is strong only among industries with low revealed comparative advantages. The difference in the coefficient for the interaction of sudden stops and external finance between columns (3) and (4) (financially underdeveloped countries) is larger than between columns (5) and (6) (financially developed countries), but the former is not significant at conventional levels. Panel B shows that considering only sudden-stop recessions does not change the conclusions. Thus, the pressure to relocate factors toward more tradable industries or the decline in domestic demand for non-tradables hurt specially those firms in non-tradable industries that also have high external financial needs. The interaction of a weak pressure for relative expansion and limited of access to finance plays strongly against these industries.
Overall, the evidence is consistent with sudden stops being associated with tightening of financial constraints resulting from the need of firms for external financing of their operations. Consistent with this mechanism, the evidence shows that the output decline of an industry during a sudden stop is larger for industries with high needs for external financing, operating in financially underdeveloped countries, and without revealed comparative advantages. These findings fare well with the literature that proposes that financial constraints at the microeconomic level, most likely those associated with working capital financing, are behind the propagation of sudden stops to the real economy. The next section further tests the robustness of these findings and show that they are not driven by specific measurement or modeling choices, or by straightforward omitted variables.
Robustness
Sudden stops may have differential effects across sectors for reasons unrelated to their need for external financing that our main coefficient may wrongly capture when other industrial characteristics are omitted. To check for this possibility, in Table 7 we add to the baseline specification a series of interactions between different industrial characteristics and the sudden stop indicators. The regression in column (1) controls for potential heterogeneous effects of sudden stops in industries producing durable goods to control for the cyclicality of their demand. There is a positive correlation of 0.22 between external dependence and durability and, as discussed earlier, durable goods' production is more cyclical than that of other goods (Bils and Klenow, 1998) . The results confirm that, indeed, the production of durable goods contracts significantly more during sudden stops. Their average decline is 4 percent larger than that of non-durable industries. The coefficient for the interaction between sudden stops and external financing declines in magnitude from -0.15 to -0.1, indicating that part of the difference documented came from the correlation between external financing needs and durability, but it is still economically and statistically significant. As previously discussed, the significant differential effect obtained for durable goods might just indicate that the production of (or demand for) these goods faces financing constraints in a manner not captured by the external dependence measure. If that were the case, part of this differential effect could still be associated with financing needs, and the main coefficient would be a conservative estimate of the true importance of financing needs. Our data, however, do not allow us to disentangle these two hypothesis (we do not have a good continuous measure of durability) so we will keep focusing on the main coefficient. Nonetheless, because of the high significance of the durable goods interaction, we will maintain it in the rest of the robustness analysis.
Capital-intensive sectors may be more dependent on the international capital flows that reverse during a sudden stop; however, we find no significant difference of the sudden stop indicator across those sectors (Column (2)). In addition, the tangibility of the assets of firms in various sectors probably relates to their debt capacity and to their ability to finance capital investment in financially underdeveloped environments or in tight credit conditions (see Almeida and Campello, 2007; Claessens and Laeven, 2003, and Braun, 2003) . The results, however, indicate that sectors with higher asset tangibility do not contract relatively more during sudden stops (Column (3)). In both regressions, the coefficient for the interaction of sudden stops and external financing needs is unaffected.
By increasing the aggregate level of unemployment and labor flows, sudden stops may affect relatively more those firms in sectors that naturally experience lower labor turnover, since workers in these sectors are likely to have higher job-specific human capital that would be costly wasted during the contraction. We check for this possibility adding the interaction of a sector's job turnover in the US with the sudden stop indicator, and find that, while the main result remains unaffected, there is no heterogeneous effect of sudden stops along this dimension (Column (4) Since controlling for durability has some impact on the magnitude and significance of the coefficient of interest, we re-estimated all the baseline results controlling for durability.
The results are reported in Table 8 . As expected, the main coefficient is somewhat smaller, but it is still economically meaningful and statistically significant across specifications. Also, the result that the coefficient is larger (in magnitude) in emerging markets and financially underdeveloped countries remains unaltered. Interestingly, however, the coefficient for the interaction with durability is also systematically larger in emerging markets and financially underdeveloped countries. The relative contraction of industries producing durable-goods in these countries is larger than in industrial and more financially developed countries (where most of the existing evidence on durable goods cyclicality comes from). This suggests that part of the contraction in durable goods output is due to the tightening of financing constraints, further confirming the view that sudden stops are indeed associated with these tightening, and provides support to the recent literature that focuses on the interaction of credit market frictions and durable expenditures (Attanasio et al., 2008; Monacelli, 2009 above. Table 9 reports the results. While there are some small quantitative differences with the results using the baseline measure of sudden stops, the main message one gets from the table is that the conclusions are largely unaffected. Regardless of the measure, Sudden Stops have a large negative average impact on industry growth, especially for those industries with high external financing needs. The difference in decline between an industry with high and low external financing needs (one standard deviation above and below the mean) is between 3 and 4 percentage points depending on the specification.
When considering sudden stop regressions these differences increase to between 4 and 6 percent.
Finally, the regressions in Table 10 show that the findings discussed above are robust to changes in the specific measure of activity, and to changes in the estimation procedure.
The regressions in columns (1) and (5) (2) and (6) address the concern that developed countries may have an excessive weight on the results because they typically have better industry coverage. To control 7 Traditional business cycles models can create volatility in durable expenditure through simple stock-flow mechanisms (e.g. Baxter, 1996) for this we re-estimate the baseline model weighting each observation by the inverse of the number of industries reported in a country in a given year. Lastly, the regressions in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) change the set of fixed effects included in the regression.
Columns (3) and (7) replace the year fixed effects by industry-year fixed effects to capture global industry trends, and columns (4) and (8) 
Do Policies Matter?
Because of the association of sudden stops with large contractions on the real side of the economy, countries take many measures to prevent the occurrence and mitigate the consequences of these episodes. The accumulation of large amounts of reserves has recently become a popular measure, both to prevent sudden stops driven by attacks on the currency and to have resources to provide liquidity in case a sudden stop occurs (self-insurance) (see Rodrik, 2006, and Aizenman and Lee, 2007) . Along the same lines, the easing of monetary policy to stimulate internal demand is also typically considered once a sudden stop occurs (Stiglitz, 2002; Caballero and Krishnamurty, 2003; Braggion, Christiano, and Roldos, 2005; Ortiz et al., 2009) . In what follows, we evaluate the shielding and dampening effects of these types of policy measures.
To evaluate whether the amount of international reserves help smooth the real consequences of a sudden stop, we add to the baseline specification the interaction of all the main variables with the ratio of international reserves to GDP before the beginning of the sudden stop. If a higher level of reserves helps smooth some of the negative consequences of sudden stops (either the average or differential effect), the coefficients of these triple interactions should be significantly positive. The results are reported in Table 11 . Looking at the occurrence of sudden stops only, the results in Panel A show that a higher level of reserves significantly smoothes its negative average output consequences, and to a lesser extent, its differential consequences among sectors with high external dependence (although not significantly so). The dampening effect on the average output decline is somewhat larger among emerging markets than in industrial countries and clearly larger in financially underdeveloped countries than in financially developed ones. In addition, among emerging markets the differential effect of sudden stops across industries with different external financing needs is significantly larger than among industrial countries.
Interestingly, there is no such dampening effect when considering only sudden-stop recessions. If anything, the average output decline in a sudden-stop recession is larger among countries with higher international reserves. This suggests that once the sudden stop actually results in a recession, having large volumes of reserves offers little help.
The relatively larger decline among countries with higher initial reserves likely indicates that sudden stops that become recessions despite these larger reserves tend to be larger.
What can then be done to dampen the impact of a sudden stop once it has already induced a recession? A policy measure that has been hotly debated, especially after the onset of the Asian Crisis of 1997, is the role of expansive monetary policy. The trade-off typically mentioned was between expanding internal demand and maintaining international demand for a country's assets.
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While the former may require reducing interest rates, the latter require maintaining high interest rates. The results in Table 12 8 See Fisher (1998) for the view that monetary policy should tighten during a sudden stop, and argue that a tightening followed by a loosening is optimal, and Hevia (2007) argues in favor of monetary tightening.
suggest that, on average, among these countries, a monetary loosening helped reduce the average and differential effects of sudden stops. While a sudden stop induces an average growth decline of almost 3 percent, there was little decline in countries that reduced their interest rate by 50 percent (respect to the pre sudden-stop level, see Column (1)).
A similar decline in interest rates would also smooth the relative decline experienced by industries with high external financing needs. Comparing across groups of countries, these effects are larger among market access than among industrial countries, and among financially underdeveloped countries than in financially developed ones.
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In contrast to a broader set of episodes than the systemic sudden stops they use to reduce the concerns of endogeneity resulting from their reliance on aggregate data.
Conclusion
Sudden stops in capital inflows are typically associated with large contractions in real activity. While part of the literature takes this as guaranteed, from a theoretical point of view a sudden stop puts pressure to expand production through wealth effects and the 9 This also shows that the difference documented in the baseline results between market access and industrial countries does not only come from the contrast between emerging markets that follow pro-cyclical policies and developed countries following countercyclical ones.
correlation between sudden stops and recessions require the presence of real rigidities that overcome this pressure. This paper used industry-level data from emerging and industrial countries to provide evidence of the likely nature of these rigidities by documenting how the differential response of industries to sudden stops relates to industry characteristics that proxy for their vulnerability to some of their rigidities. In particular, we show that industries that require higher levels of external financing suffer more from these episodes, especially when, at the aggregate level, the sudden stop coincides with recessions, and particularly so among less financially developed countries. This strongly suggests that a feature of these episodes is the tightening of financing constraints and that financing rigidities at the micro level are behind the negative consequences of sudden stops.
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Country
(columns (6) to (10)) consider the impact of sudden stop recession episodes. Sudden Stop Recession is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if sudden stop is associated with an output contraction and zero otherwise. External Finance is a measure of an industry's needs for external financing (Rajan and Zingales(1998)) and varies only across industries. Sudden Stop X External Finance is the interaction between the respective sudden stop indicator and the measure of external finance.
Regressions in columns (1) and (6) include all countries in the sample, that is developing countries with access to international financial markets (Market Access) and industrial countries (Industrial). Regressions in columns (2) and (7) include only Market Access countries, and those in columns (3) and (8) only Industrial countries.
Regressions in columns (4) and (9) include only sample countries with average total capitalization (stock market capitalization plus private creit to GDP) below the sample median, and those in columns (5) and (10) those countries with total capitalization above the sample median. All regressions include countryindustry and year fixed effects. Heterokesdacity robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry level are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) The dependent variable is the growth in the index of industrial production of an industry in a given country and year. Share of output is the fraction of a country's total annual manufacturing output represented by each industry. Regressions in Panel A (columns (1) to (5)) consider the impact of sudden stop episodes. In these regressions, Sudden Stop is dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a country experiences a sudden stop in a given year and zero otherwise. Regressions in Panel B (columns (6) to (10)) consider the impact of sudden stop recession episodes. Sudden Stop Recession is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if sudden stop is associated with an output contraction and zero otherwise. Sudden Stop X Growth is the interaction between the sudden stop indicator considered in each panel and the contermporaneous real GDP growth rate. External Finance is a measure of an industry's needs for external financing (Rajan and Zingales)) and varies only across industries. Sudden Stop X Growth X External Finance represents the triple interaction of the sudden stop indicator, the contemporaneous growth rate and the external finance measure.Regressions in columns (1) and (6) include all countries in the sample, that is developing countries with access to international financial markets (Market Access) and industrial countries (Industrial). Regressions in columns (2) and (7) include only Market Access countries, and those in columns (3) and (8) only Industrial countries. Regressions in columns (4) and (9) include only sample countries with average total capitalization (stock market capitalization plus private creit to GDP) below the sample median, and those in columns (5) and (10) those countries with total capitalization above the sample median. All regressions include country-industry and year fixed effects. Heterokesdacity robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry level are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
(1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (6) (7) (8) total capitalization below the sample median, and those in (5) and (10) countries with total capitalization above the sample median. All regressions include country-industry and year fixed effects. Heterokesdacity robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry level are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
(1) The dependent variable is the growth in the index of industrial production of an industry in a given country and year. Share of output is the fraction of a country's total annual manufacturing output represented by each industry. Regressions in Panel A (columns (1) to (4)) consider the impact of sudden stop episodes. In these regressions, Sudden Stop is dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a country experiences a sudden stop in a given year and zero otherwise. Regressions in Panel B (columns (5) to (8)) consider the impact of sudden stop recession episodes. Sudden Stop Recession is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if sudden stop is associated with an output contraction and zero otherwise. External Finance is a measure of an industry's needs for external financing (Rajan and Zingales (1998)) and has been normalized to have zero mean and unit standard deviation. Sudden Stop X External Finance is the interaction between the respective sudden stop indicator and the measure of external finance. The same applies to the other interaction variables. All regressions include all countries in the sample, that is developing countries with access to international financial markets (Market Access) and industrial countries (Industrial). Regressions in columns (1) and (5) use the methodology of Braun and Larrain (2006) to define a recession. Regressions in columns (2) and (6) give equal weight to all countries regardless of the number of manufdacturing industries for which there is data. This is done by using weights that are inversely proportional to the number of industries reported by a country in each year. Regressions in columns (3) and (7) include industry-year FE to absorb global industry trends, and those in columns (4) and (8) include country-year FE to absorb all aggregate determinants of fluctuations. All regressions include country-industry fixed effects.
Heterokesdacity robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry level are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent (1) and (6) include all countries in the sample, that is developing countries with access to international financial markets (Market Access) and industrial countries (Industrial). Regressions in columns (2) and (7) include only Market Access countries, and those in columns (3) and (8) only Industrial countries. Regressions in columns (4) and (9) include only sample countries with average total capitalization (stock market capitalization plus private creit to GDP) below the sample median, and those in columns (5) and (10) those countries with total capitalization above the sample median. All regressions include country-industry and year fixed effects. Heterokesdacity robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry level are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.
(1) The dependent variable is the growth in the index of industrial production of an industry in a given country and year. Share of output is the fraction of a country's total annual manufacturing output represented by each industry. Regressions in Panel A (columns (1) to (5)) consider the impact of sudden stop episodes. In these regressions, Sudden Stop is dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a country experiences a sudden stop in a given year and zero otherwise. Regressions in Panel B (columns (6) to (10)) consider the impact of sudden stop recession episodes.
Sudden Stop Recession is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if sudden stop is associated with an output contraction and zero otherwise. Change Interest Rate is the cumulative percentage decline in money market rates during the sudden stop episode. External Finance is a measure of an industry's needs for external financing (Rajan and Zingales)) and varies only across industries. Sudden Stop X Change Interest Rate, Sudden Stop X External Finance, and Sudden Stop X Chg. Int. Rate X Ext. Finance, denote the interactions between the variables described above. Regressions in columns (1) and (6) include all countries in the sample, that is developing countries with access to international financial markets (Market Access) and industrial countries (Industrial). Regressions in columns (2) and (7) include only Market Access countries, and those in columns (3) and (8) only Industrial countries. Regressions in columns (4) and (9) include only sample countries with average total capitalization (stock market capitalization plus private creit to GDP) below the sample median, and those in columns (5) and (10) those countries with total capitalization above the sample median. All regressions include country-industry and year fixed effects. Heterokesdacity robust standard errors, clustered at the country-industry level are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
